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PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE LEGAL LIMITS
IN SINGAPORE
Article 35(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of
Singapore states that the Attorney-General, as the Public
Prosecutor, "shall have the power, exercisable at his discretion,
to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any
offence" This prosecutorial discretion, though extremely
wide, is not an unfettered one and must not be exercised in
bad faith or in breach of constitutional rights. With respect to
the equality provision in the Constitution, the Prosecution
has to give unbiased consideration to all potential accused
persons and avoid any irrelevant considerations. The article
considers whether the presumption of the constitutionality
of prosecutorial decisions and the onerous burden on
the accused person to displace the presumption should be
re-examined. Further, the Prosecutor should consider
disclosing the reasons underlying the prosecutorial decisions
as far as possible, subject to minimising potential risks and
publishing guidelines on prosecutorial decision-making.
Gary CHAN Kok Yew
LLB (Hons), MA (National University of Singapore),
LLM, BA (University of London);
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University.
I. Introduction
1 In recent years, the issue of prosecutorial discretion has
generated much publicity, debate and, at times, disquiet in Singapore. In
2008, a donor and recipient of a kidney were both charged under the
Human Organ Transplant Act' for entering into an illegal sale and
purchase of a kidney as well as for making a false statement in a
statutory declaration under the Oaths and Declarations Act2 ("ODA").
A letter to The Straits Times criticised the Prosecution for its decision to
charge the recipient, who was in ill health, under the ODA, which had
resulted in his jail term. The Attorney-General's Chambers defended its
position vigorously, and explained that it had "weighed all the relevant
factors in the scales of justice and exercised considerable compassion in
1 Cap 131A, 2005 Rev Ed. The current version is 2012 Rev Ed.
2 Cap 211, 2001 Rev Ed.
3 Lee Wei Ling, "Why a Jail Term Shouldn't have been Sought", The Straits Times
(10 September 2008).
Singapore Academy of Law Journal
urging the court to temper justice with mercy, accepting the judgment
of the court to impose the very shortest sentence possible".4
2 More recently, a plastic surgeon was charged under the Road
Traffic Acts with abetting his employee to provide false information
to the police about traffic offences involving speeding and was fined
$1,000. The public queried whether the surgeon was let off with a light
charge just because he was wealthy instead of a heavier charge under
s 204A of the Penal Code6 for intentionally perverting the course of
justice. The Attorney-General's Chambers explained that the offences
had taken place before that provision of the Penal Code came into force.
The Minister for Law stated that the court sentence was consistent with
the norm, and dismissed allegations that there was any differential
charging between the "haves" and "have-nots", in order to quell the
public perceptions of unfairness and inconsistency in respect of the
prosecutorial decision.!
3 Another source of contention is related to the public debate as
to whether Singapore should retain or repeal s 377A of the Penal Code,8
which criminalises "acts of gross decency", be it in public or in private,
between males. The Government, upon stating that Singapore remains
a "conservative society" and that Singaporeans do not approve of
homosexuals "actively promoting their lifestyles to others, or setting the
tone for mainstream society", decided to retain s 377A.9 However, it
adopted the stance that it will not proactively enforce the statutory
provision against adult males engaging in consensual sex with each other
in private.o
4 In the subsequent case of Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General,"
the applicant had been originally charged for an offence under s 377A of
4 See Attorney-General's Chambers, "Justice, Compassion and Prosecutorial
Discretion" (18 September 2008) <http://www.webcitation.org/5oxuxhaqJ>
(accessed 11 January 2013); see also Public Prosecutor v Tang Wee Sung [2008]
SGDC 262.
5 Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed.
6 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed.
7 See AsiaOne, "AGC Releases Statement on Woffles Wu Case", AsiaOne (17 June
2012) <http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Singapore/Story/AlStory
20120617-353397.html> (accessed 11 January 2013); Singapore Parliamentary
Debates, Official Report, "Conviction of Dr Woffles Wu for Abetment of Giving
False Information" (13 August 2012), vol 89.
8 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed.
9 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (23 October 2007), vol 83 at col 2354
(Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister and Minister for Finance).
10 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (23 October 2007), vol 83 at col 2354
(Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister and Minister for Finance).
11 [2011] 3 SLR 320.
16 (2013) 25 SAcLJ
Prosecutorial Discretion and the
(2013) 25 SAcLJ Legal Limits in Singapore 17
the Penal Code,12 but it was amended to one under s 294(a) of the Penal
Code," after the applicant had issued a constitutional challenge against
s 377A. The Attorney-General applied for, and successfully obtained
from the High Court, an order for the s 377A application to be struck
out. However, this decision has been reversed by the Court of Appeal in
Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General" ("Tan Eng Hong"), on the basis that
the applicant had locus standi because there was an arguable violation of
his constitutional rights. This means that the accused person would still
be able to advance substantive arguments before the Singapore courts in
the near future in order to challenge the constitutionality of s 377A on
the merits of the case. Moreover, on the ministerial statements that
s 377A will not be "proactively" enforced, the court indicated that they
do not fetter the discretion of the Attorney-General."
5 The Attorney-General is the Public Prosecutor empowered to
prosecute accused persons, under the Constitution of the Republic of
Singapore ("the Constitution"). He is not elected but appointed by the
President, should the President acting in his discretion concur with the
advice of the Prime Minister. In so far as prosecutorial powers are
concerned, Art 35(8) of the Constitution confers on the Attorney-
General the "power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct
or discontinue any proceedings for any offence". He has control and
direction with respect to all criminal prosecutions under the written
law.18
6 In practice, the range of prosecutorial decisions that may be
undertaken is potentially very wide. In addition to decisions on whether
to commence prosecutions against a suspect, the Prosecution has the
discretion to decide on the possible charges against the accused person,
whether to discontinue pending criminal proceedings, and whether to
appeal against the acquittal of the accused or against the sentences
passed by the courts. Where a prosecution is brought by a private person
against the accused, the Public Prosecutor will have to decide whether to
take over the conduct of prosecution, allow the private prosecution to
proceed or to intervene in, or discontinue, the proceedings."
12 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed.
13 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed.
14 [2012] 4 SLR476.
15 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at [ 18 1].
16 The Attorney-General also acts as the main legal adviser to the Government on
civil matters: Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 35(7).
17 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 35(1).
18 Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (Act 15 of 2010) s 11.
19 See Criminal Procedure Code 2010 ("CPC 2010") (Act 15 of 2010) s 13. The Public
Prosecutor's fiat is required for the initiation by a private person of prosecution on
the person's own behalf, except for summary cases before a Magistrates' Court for
offences that entail imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or
punishable with a fine only (ss 11(10) and 12 of the CPC 2010). After a private
(cont'd on the next page)
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7 Depending on the type and severity of the offences, the penal
statutes may stipulate for mandatory caning, prison sentences or death
penalty. Mandatory death sentences are currently prescribed for murder
and drug-trafficking offences, though the Government is considering
legislative reforms to allow for judicial discretion on sentencing
for specific instances of these offences.20 If the Prosecution decides
to prosecute, his choice between two charges (assuming one with
mandatory penalties and the other without) would have serious
consequences for the accused person.21 Plea negotiations between the
Prosecutor and the suspect or accused person 22 may have an important
bearing on the choice of charges to bring. During, or as a result of, such
negotiations, an accused person may decide to plead guilty to a lesser
charge in exchange for the Prosecutor withdrawing a more serious
charge, or alternatively, plead guilty to certain charges in exchange for
the Prosecution dropping other charges.
8 Prosecutions for offences involving the mandatory death
penalty 3 naturally attract high-level publicity. In 2012, the Court of
Appeal was confronted with two significant cases on the scope of
prosecutorial discretion under the Constitution, involving the differential
charging of co-offenders participating in the same criminal enterprise.
In Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General' ("Ramalingam"), the
co-offenders were in possession of cannabis and cannabis mixture. The
applicant (Ramalingam) was charged under the Misuse of Drugs Act 25
for trafficking with the actual amount of cannabis and cannabis
mixture, which attracted the mandatory death penalty. The other
co-offender was, however, charged with trafficking a lower amount of
prosecution has been initiated, the Public Prosecutor retains the discretion to
intervene in the proceedings, eg, to enter a nolle prosequi, which will result in the
accused being granted a discharge: see s 184(1) of the CPC (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed);
s 232 of the CPC 2010 (Act 15 of 2010); Martinez Marites Dela Cruz v Public
Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 142 at [1]; and Arjan Singh v Public Prosecutor [1993]
1 SLR(R) 542). Under the CPC, only the Public Prosecutor, not the private person,
has the right to appeal against an order of acquittal or conviction by the court:
see s 376 of the CPC 2010 (Act 15 of 2010); Martinez Marites Dela Cruz v Public
Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 142 at [3]. Where the private person decides to lodge
an appeal against the court's decision, the Public Prosecutor is entitled to intervene
and discontinue the proceedings: Cheng William v Loo Ngee Long Edmund [2001]
2 SLR(R) 626; JasbirKaur vMuktiarSingh [1999] 1 SLR(R) 616.
20 See Leonard Lim, "Death Penalty: Govt to Grant Judges Some Discretion", The
Straits Times (10 July 2012).
21 Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Malaysia and
Singapore (LexisNexis, 2012) at p 30.
22 Public Prosecutor v Knight Glenn Jeyasingham [ 1999] 1 SLR(R) 1165.
23 Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49; Quek Hock Lye v
Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 1012; Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011]
2 SLR 1189; Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 872.
24 [2012] 2 SLR49.
25 Cap 185, 2001 Rev Ed.
18 (2013) 25 SAcLJ
Prosecutorial Discretion and the
(2013) 25 SAcLJ Legal Limits in Singapore 19
the drugs, which did not attract the mandatory death penalty. Upon
conviction by the High Court, Ramalingam filed a criminal motion for
the capital charges against him to be amended to non-capital charges
and for the sentence imposed by the High Court to be set aside, arguing
that the Attorney-General had exercised his discretion contrary to the
equal protection clause, namely, Art 12 of the Constitution.26
9 Before the heat and dust from Ramalingam had settled, the case
of Quek Hock Lye v Public Prosecutor27 ("Quek Hock Lye") followed
quickly on its heels. Quek had participated with a co-offender to traffic
diamorphine contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act. Quek was convicted
and sentenced to death for the offence of possession of drugs in
furtherance of criminal conspiracy with the co-offender to traffic the
drugs. The co-offender was charged for the same offence but involving a
lower quantity of drugs, and was therefore spared the death penalty. In a
similar vein, Quek's counsel argued that the differential charges against
Quek and the co-offender constituted a breach of Art 12 of the
Constitution.
10 Both Ramalingam and Quek failed in their quest to set aside
their convictions. First, the court confirmed that the two legal limits to
prosecutorial discretion are breach of constitutional rights and bad
faith. In essence, it decided that there was a presumption of
constitutionality of prosecutorial discretion premised on the doctrine of
separation of powers, and insufficient prima facie evidence of a breach
of Art 12 to rebut that presumption. Further, the Attorney-General is
not obliged to supply reasons for his prosecutorial decisions. Both cases
have nevertheless raised legitimate questions about the scope of the
Attorney-General's prosecutorial powers. How wide is the discretion to
prosecute? Should the Judiciary intervene; if so, in what circumstances?
How should the parameters be drawn? What are the underlying
rationales? Should the Prosecutor not be required to provide reasons for
his decisions?
11 This article is concerned as much about criminal justice as it is
about the legal limits of powers granted to important organs of state,
in particular, the Prosecution. The crux of the issue is the life and liberty
of the individual, lying in the intersection of criminal justice and
constitutional law, and in this regard, the Judiciary clearly plays a vital
role. Apart from local precedents, the court also examines foreign
sources, such as Malaysian, Indian, English and US case authorities, on
the limits and application of prosecutorial power. The current legal
26 Article 12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint)
states: "All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of
the law."
27 [2012] 2 SLR 1012.
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limits to prosecutorial discretion based on a breach of constitutional
rights and the doctrine of bad faith, as delineated by the Judiciary, are,
in principle, sound. However, as will be argued below, the scope of the
presumption of constitutionality of prosecutorial discretion and the
narrow circumstances in which such presumption may be rebutted
should be re-examined. Further, though the Prosecutor need not be
obliged to disclose his reasons for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in every case, arguments may be advanced for reasons to be
disclosed by the Prosecutor as far as possible, subject to minimising
potential risks, and for guidelines on prosecutorial decision-making to
be disseminated to the public.
II. The legal limits to prosecutorial discretion in Singapore
12 Common law jurisdictions generally allow for a wide, though
not unlimited, scope of prosecutorial discretion. Courts in the UK,28 the
US,29 Canadas0 and Trinidad and Tobago31 have generally adopted the
position that, while the decision to prosecute may in principle be
susceptible to judicial review, it would in practice be extremely rare for
the Judiciary to intervene in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
This wide scope of prosecutorial discretion (or narrow scope for judicial
intervention) is premised on the doctrine of separation of powers,3 as
well as the view that the considerations and issues requiring the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion are not amenable to judicial review.
28 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Mead [ 1993] 1 All ER 772; R v Director
of Public Prosecutions ex parte C [ 1995] 1 Cr App R 136; R (Bermingham) v Director
of the Serious Fraud Office [2007] 2 WLR 635. In the UK, the discretion lies with the
Crown Prosecution Office headed by the Director of Public Prosecutions, who is in
turn accountable to the UK Attorney-General.
29 United States v Batchelder 442 US 114 (1979). In the US, prosecutorial power is
granted to US attorneys via the Judiciary Act of 1789 ch 20, 1 Stat 73 (US).
30 Kostuch vAttorney General ofAlberta (1995) 128 DLR (4th) 440.
31 Sharma v Browne-Antoine [2006] UKPC 57 (on appeal from the Court of Appeal of
Trinidad and Tobago).
32 R v Power (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 1 (Supreme Court of Canada) at [39]; R (Corner
House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office (JUSTICE intervening)
[2009] 1 AC 756 at [31], per Lord Bingham.
33 Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] 4 LRC 712 at 735-736; R v Power
(1994) 89 CCC (3d) 1 (Supreme Court of Canada) at [39]; Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v Nelson A Rockefeller 477 F 2d 375 at 380 (1973) (that
"difficult questions" pertaining to, for example, the appropriate point in time for
prosecutorial intervention, evidentiary standards for compelling prosecution and
the amount of leeway for prosecutorial judgment, engender "serious doubts" as to
the judicial capacity to review prosecutorial decisions); United States v Christopher
Lee Armstrong 517 US 456 (1996) (that factors such as "the strength of the case, the
prosecutor's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities,
and the relationship of the case to the Government's overall enforcement plan" are
not susceptible to judicial analysis).
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13 In Singapore, prosecutorial powers are similarly wide in scope,
but not absolute. Prior to Ramalingam and Quek Hock Lye, the legal
limits to prosecutorial discretion were already outlined in Law Society of
Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis" ("Tan Guat Neo Phyllis"). There, the
Court of Appeal held that all legal powers have legal limits and the
concept of an unfettered discretion is contrary to the Rule of Law. On
the specific limits, it stated that prosecutorial discretion must be
exercised in good faith and not for an extraneous purpose or in breach
of constitutional rights. This means that the court cannot stay the
prosecution initiated by the Attorney-General based generally on the
doctrine of abuse of process," unless it is shown that the prosecutorial
discretion was not exercised in good faith or in breach of the
Constitution.
14 In a different context involving the clemency power of the
Executive under Art 22P38 of the Constitution, the court in Yong Vui
Kong v Attorney-General" ("Yong Vui Kong") had also emphasised that
the exercise of the executive power cannot be mala fide or exceed
constitutional limits. The same legal limits were applied in Huang
Meizhe v Attorney-Generalo to deny a challenge by the deceased victim's
widow and mother against the Prosecutor's refusal to appeal against the
sentence meted out to the accused person. Conversely, the court in
34 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239.
35 Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [149]
(citing Chng Suan Tze v Ministerfor Home Affairs [ 1988] 2 SLR(R) 525).
36 Abuse of process referred to the use of the judicial process for "a purpose for which
it is not intended or in circumstances where the extraneous purpose is the
dominant purpose for its use": see Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis
[2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [130].
37 Cf Rv Jewitt (1985) 21 CCC (3d) 7 (Supreme Court of Canada) at [26] (that the
judge has a "residual discretion" to stay proceedings where compelling an accused
to stand trial would violate the "fundamental principles which underlie the
community's sense of fair play and decency and to prevent the abuse of a court's
process through oppressive or vexatious proceedings").
38 Article 22P of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) reads:
The President, as occasion shall arise, may, on the advice of the Cabinet -
(a) grant a pardon to any accomplice in any offence who gives
information which leads to the conviction of the principal offender or any one
of the principal offenders, if more than one;
(b) grant to any offender convicted of any offence in any court in
Singapore, a pardon, free or subject to lawful conditions, or any reprieve or
respite, either indefinite or for such period as the President may think fit, of
the execution of any sentence pronounced on such offender; or
(c) remit the whole or any part of such sentence or of any penalty or
forfeiture imposed by law.
39 [2011] 2 SLR 1189 at [80].
40 [2011] 2 SLR 1149. Applying the decision in Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat
Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239, the High Court found no evidence of bad faith or
breach of constitutional rights.
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Tan Eng Hong4 ' has recently confirmed that there is a right not to be
prosecuted under an unconstitutional law. Thus, where a prosecution is
brought under an unconstitutional law, the decision to prosecute under
that law will also be unconstitutional.
15 The following section discusses both the constitutional limits
(equal protection and prohibition against double jeopardy) as well as
the doctrine of bad faith.
A. Equal protection under the law
16 Ramalingam and Quek Hock Lye have presented a unique
opportunity to scrutinise the operation of the equal protection
provision as a challenge to prosecutorial decision-making, in particular,
the decision involving the prosecution of co-offenders participating in
the same criminal enterprise.42 The applicant in Ramalingam contended
that the Attorney-General had exercised his prosecutorial discretion
contrary to the equal protection clause embodied in Art 12 of the
Constitution. Though the application was denied due to the lack of
prima facie evidence of unconstitutionality, the pronouncements of the
Court of Appeal have significantly advanced the jurisprudence relating
to prosecutorial discretion and Art 12.
17 The first and crucial point identified by the Court of Appeal is
that "an exercise of an executive decision-making power, even one with a
constitutional status, cannot be allowed to override a fundamental
liberty enshrined in the Constitution".43 With respect to Art 12, the Privy
Council decision (on appeal from Malaysia) of Teh Cheng Poh v Public
Prosecutor" ("Teh Cheng Poh") was applied. It involved a prosecutorial
choice between two statutes giving rise to two different punishments.
The issue was whether the Malaysian Attorney-General's decision to
prosecute the accused under one particular statute, which attracted
capital punishment instead of another set of statutes' that did not, was
against Art 8 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia4 1 (in pari materia
41 Tan EngHong vAttorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at [113], [171], [175].
42 See also Sinniah Pillay v Public Prosecutor [1991] 2 SLR(R) 704 (that the Prosecutor
had the prerogative to charge the appellant under a different statute, ie, s 326
of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed), from that of his co-conspirators under
the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act (Cap 65,
1985 Rev Ed)).
43 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [41].
44 [1979] 1 MLJ 50.
45 Internal Security Act 1960 (No 82 of 1972) (M'sia) s 57(1).
46 Arms Act 1960 (No 21 of 1960) (M'sia), read with Firearms (Increased Penalties)
Act 1971 (No 37 of 1971) (M'sia).
47 7th Reprint, 1978.
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with Art 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore)." The
court opined that Art 12 required the Prosecution to give unbiased
consideration to all potential accused persons and to avoid any
irrelevant considerations (what the author would refer to as the
"impartiality test").4 9 Moreover, in tandem with the Rule of Law, like
cases should be treated alike (the "consistency test").0 The court in
Ramalingam has now confirmed that the impartiality and consistency
tests in Teh Cheng Poh would be similarly applicable to the case of
several offenders involved in the same or similar offences committed in
the same criminal enterprise.
18 It suffices to note at this juncture that the obligation on the
Attorney-General to apply the consistency test under Art 12 of the
Constitution5 2 did not prevent him from taking into account certain
factors in prosecutorial decision-making. In fact, these factors may be
applied differently to different accused persons in order to justify
differential treatment, as in Ramalingam and Quek Hock Lye, that is,
charging a defendant differently from his co-offender by reducing the
quantity of drugs specified in the charge.
19 The impartiality and consistency tests, though useful, are
couched in fairly broad terms. This gives rise to the question of what the
more concrete circumstances that would amount to a breach of Art 12
are. In this regard, the court referred to Thiruselvam slo Nagaratnam v
Public Prosecutor53 ("Thiruselvam"). In that case, one K was arrested
when he offered to sell cannabis to a Central Narcotics Bureau ("CNB")
officer. Thiruselvam was arrested on his way to receive money from a
CNB officer after making calls to K (which calls were intercepted and
answered by the CNB officer). Thiruselvam was charged with abetting
48 The Privy Council decided that there was no evidence that the Prosecution had
exercised his discretion unlawfully.
49 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [51].
50 See the following quote from Sharma v Browne-Antoine [2006] UKPC 57 at 786-787
(on appeal from the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago): "The rule of law
requires that, subject to any immunity or exemption provided by law, the criminal
law of the land should apply to all alike. A person is not to be singled out for
adverse treatment because he or she holds a high and dignified office of state, but
nor can the holding of such an office excuse conduct which would lead to the
prosecution of one not holding such an office. The maintenance of public
confidence in the administration of justice requires that it be, and be seen to be,
even-handed."
51 Sim Min Teck v Public Prosecutor ("Sim Min Teck") [ 1987] SLR(R) 65 concerned
co-offenders involved in the same criminal enterprise but charged with different
offences. The Court of Appeal in Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General
[2012] 2 SLR 49 at [32] observed that the decision in Sim Min Teck had applied
Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 50 in a straightforward manner,
without recognising the material differences in the facts between the two cases.
52 1992 Reprint.
53 [2001] 1 SLR(R) 362.
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the trafficking of cannabis (a capital offence), whilst K was charged with
two non-capital offences. On the question of Art 12, L P Thean JA noted
that Thiruselvam was only an abettor of K, who committed the main
offence. However, the judge was of the view that the Prosecution has
a wide discretion to bring charges of different severity as between
participants in the same criminal activity, and concluded that there was
no breach of Art 12.
20 The Court of Appeal in Ramalingam, however, found the
approach in Thiruselvam "uncritical"' and proceeded to evaluate the
facts in Thiruselvam. It observed that Thiruselvam could have been
more culpable than K, as Thiruselvam had acted as a "controller or
supplier" of the drugs, in instructing K to pay him the proceeds of the
sale of drugs upon the delivery of the drugs." Further, the offence of
abetment generally carries the same punishment as the substantive
offence, and the abettor in Thiruselvam would have posed a greater
danger to society than the actual drug trafficker. What is even more
central, for the purpose of this article, is the Court of Appeal's statement
in Ramalingam about a hypothetical circumstance that would amount
to a breach of Art 12, that is, if the evidence had indeed shown
Thiruselvam to have played a lesser role, the Prosecution should not have
charged him with the more serious capital offence as compared to K. If
the Prosecution had done so in these circumstances, it would, with all
other things being equal between Thiruselvam and K, have amounted to
an arbitrary or biased exercise of prosecutorial discretion and hence a
prima facie breach of Art 12.
21 Another hypothetical circumstance that would amount to a
breach of Art 12 was highlighted in Tan Guat Neo Phyllis," where the
court opined, in the context of entrapment evidence obtained by law
enforcement officers, that a failure to prosecute might be in breach of
the constitutional right to equality if the Attorney-General condones
"the unlawful conduct of law enforcement officers, which is particularly
egregious" [emphasis added] . In this connection, it is apposite to refer
54 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR49 at [36].
55 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [38].
56 Section 109 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) states:
Whoever abets any offence shall, if the act abetted is committed in
consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code
for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with the punishment
provided for the offence.
57 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [37].
58 Law Society ofSingapore v Tan GuatNeo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239.
59 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [147].
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to R v Sang in which the House of Lords referred to the "unusual" case
where:61
... a dishonest policeman, anxious to improve his detection record,
tries very hard with the help of an agent provocateur to induce a
young man with no criminal tendencies to commit a serious crime;
and ultimately the young man succumbs to the inducement ... [T]he
policeman and the informer who had acted together in inciting him to
commit the crime should ... both be prosecuted and suitably
punished. [621
22 The test of whether the conduct of the law enforcement officers
was so "egregious", such that a failure to prosecute might contravene
Art 12, is a stringent one. In Mohamed Emran bin Mohamed Ali v Public
Prosecutor," the appellant, who was convicted of drug trafficking,
alleged that he was entrapped by a state agent to traffic in drugs. The
court held that the failure of the Public Prosecutor to prosecute the state
agents provocateurs was not contrary to Art 12 of the Constitution." The
undercover operations, which were "targeted at suppliers of drugs"
through "necessary subterfuge", did not fall within the "egregious"
description.
B. Prohibition against double jeopardy
23 Apart from Art 12 as a constitutional limit to prosecutorial
discretion, reference should also be made to Art 11(2) on the
prohibition against double jeopardy. The prohibition against double
jeopardy protects a person from the peril of criminal penalties more
than once for the same offence. Given the specific facts and applications
in Tan Guat Neo Phyllis, Ramalingam and Quek Hock Lye, there was no
necessity for the Court of Appeal to specifically examine double
jeopardy as a constitutional restraint on prosecutorial powers. However,
it is clear from the cases that prosecutorial powers cannot transgress any
part of the Constitution. Article 11(2) of the Constitution" states:
60 [1980] AC 402.
61 [1980] AC 402 at 443.
62 Cited in Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239
at [80].
63 [2008] 4 SLR(R) 411.
64 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint).
65 Emran bin Mohamed Ali v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 411 at [33].
In construing whether the prosecutorial decision was against Art 12, the High
Court applied the traditional test for determining the constitutionality of a statute
in the face of an Art 12 challenge. As the prosecutorial decision was based on an
intelligible differentia between entrapped drug traffickers (who had the mens rea
and actus reas to promote the drug trade) and the state agents provocateurs (who
were sanctioned by the State to curb the drug trade, which is a socially desirable
objective), it was not unconstitutional.
66 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint).
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A person who has been convicted or acquitted of an offence shall not
be tried again for the same offence except where the conviction or
acquittal has been quashed and a retrial ordered by a court superior to
that by which he was convicted or acquitted.
This doctrine of double jeopardy is also reflected in s 244 of the
Criminal Procedure Code 2010.67
24 The High Court in Re Wee Harry Lee68 endorsed the House
of Lords' decision in Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions6 1
("Connelly"), that the doctrine of autrefois convicO only applies where
the accused is charged with the same offence, in fact and in law.7' As
stated by Lord Morris in Connelly, "the test is ... whether such proof as
is necessary to convict of the second offence would establish guilt of the
first offence or of an offence for which on the first charge there could be
a conviction".72 The law did not prevent the same set of circumstances
from giving rise to two separate breaches of the law and for the offender
to be punished for both breaches. However, when the elements of one
offence necessarily encompassed the elements of another, the offender
could be said to be doubly punished should he be charged and convicted
for committing both offences. 73 This occurs, for example, when a person
is charged and convicted of inflicting "grievous hurt" on another,
contrary to s 322 of the Penal Code' and for causing "hurt" under s 321
of the same Code.
25 Apart from the requirement as to the content of the offences
in question, there must have also been a previous criminal "conviction"
(or "acquittal") of an "offence". A detention under the Misuse of Drugs
Act in the Drug Rehabilitation Centre as ordered by the Director of the
Central Narcotics Bureau,' for example, does not amount to a criminal
67 Act 15 of 2010.
68 [1983-1984] SLR(R) 274. The first complaint - that the respondent had delayed in
reporting to the Law Society of Singapore the conduct of a legal assistant employed
by him for misappropriating clients' moneys in circumstances amounting to
grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty (see s 84(2)(b)
of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 217, 1970 Rev Ed) - was clearly different from the
second complaint, that the respondent has been convicted of criminal offences
implying a defect of character, which makes him unfit for his profession under
ss 84(1) and 84(2)(a) of the Legal Profession Act.
69 [1964] AC 1254.
70 It means "formerly convicted".
71 See Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; Island Maritime Ltd v Filipowski
(2006) 226 CLR 328.
72 Connelly v Director ofPublic Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254 at 1309.
73 Arjun Upadhya v Public Prosecutor [2011] 1 SLR 119.
74 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed.
75 Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) s 34(2)(b). The Director must be
satisfied that it was "necessary" for the accused to "undergo treatment or
rehabilitation or both at an approved institution".
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conviction.76 In the determination of the detention order, there is no
question of a specific charge or offence committed by the detainee.
Hence, such a prior detainee, who is subsequently charged and
convicted of the offence of unauthorised drug consumption under the
same statute based on the same incident for which he was detained
under the Act, cannot challenge the prosecutorial decision based on the
doctrine of double jeopardy.77
C. Bad faith
26 As discussed above, in the Singapore decisions of Tan Guat Neo
Phyllis' and Yong Vui Kong," the element of bad faith was cited as a
ground for judicial review, in addition to breach of constitutional rights.
To act in bad faith is to do so for extraneous purposes,"o that is, outside
the purpose for which the power is intended, which is the conviction
and punishment of offenders.'
27 The Court of Appeal in Tan Guat Neo Phyllis analysed a
prosecution for extraneous purposes (bad faith) separately from
prosecution in breach of constitutional rights. It stated that where the
Prosecutor prosecutes an offender for extraneous purposes instead of
punishing him for the offence, there is an abuse of prosecutorial power,
which is also an abuse of the judicial process. However, where there is, in
an entrapment scenario, a failure of the Prosecutor to prosecute certain
unlawful and egregious conduct of law enforcement officers, this may
constitute discriminatory treatment amounting to a breach of
constitutional rights.82
76 Nonetheless, previous Drug Rehabilitation Centre admissions may constitute
aggravating factors for purposes of subjecting offenders to enhanced minimum
punishments under s 33A of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): see
Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] SGHC 163 at [46]; Amazi
bin Hawasi v Public Prosecutor [2012] SGHC 164 at [ 17].
77 Lim Keng Chia v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 1. The court, based on a perusal
of the parliamentary debates, decided that Parliament did not regard the making of
a detention order as a bar to subsequent prosecution of the detainee after release
from the Drug Rehabilitation Centre.
78 Law Society ofSingapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239.
79 Yong Vui Kong vAttorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189.
80 Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [ 148]-[ 149].
See also decisions such as R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene
[2000] 2 AC 326 at 376 ("dishonesty, bad faith or some other exceptional
circumstance") and R v Power (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 1 at 17 ("improper motives or
of bad faith or of an act so wrong that it violates the conscience of the
community").
81 Law Society ofSingapore v Tan GuatNeo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [149].
82 Law Society ofSingapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [147].
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28 It is true that acting in bad faith is not equivalent to breaching
the equality protection clause. For example, prosecuting A for an offence
for the sole purpose of harassment when the Prosecutor has no evidence
to support the charge or charging a suspect with serious charges solely
for the purpose of compelling him to plead guilty to lesser charges
would amount to acting in bad faith, without any concomitant breach
of constitutional rights. However, the application of the concept of
"bad faith" may in certain situations overlap with a breach of Art 12 of
the Constitution. After all, one aspect of the impartiality test is that the
Prosecutor should avoid taking into account irrelevant considerations in
his decision-making. This appears to overlap with the notion of the
Prosecutor not acting for extraneous purposes (bad faith). If suspects A
and B played similar roles in the same criminal activity, and the
Prosecutor, with a personal vendetta against suspect A arising from a
prior sour relationship, brings more serious charges against suspect A
in comparison to the lenient charges brought against suspect B,
the Prosecutor would be acting for an extraneous purpose (bad faith)
as well as in breach of the equal protection provision (breach of
impartiality and consistency tests).
29 If the Prosecutor acts in a non-independent manner, such as by
bowing to political pressures, it might constitute a ground for judicial
review. In Sharma v Browne-Antoine," for example, it was said that the
"surrender of what should be an independent prosecutorial discretion
to political instruction (or ... persuasion or pressure) is a recognised
ground of review," and that "[i]t is a grave violation of their
professional and legal duty to allow their judgment to be swayed br
extraneous considerations such as political pressure" [emphasis added].
The above example, it is submitted, should be considered as one of
acting in bad faith. This is applicable to Singapore, given that the
Attorney-General should be independent from the Government, in
so far as the exercise of prosecutorial powers is concerned under
the Constitution. However, not all kinds of political pressure on
prosecutorial decision-making will necessarily result in judicial
intervention. For example, the House of Lords in R (Corner House
Research) v Serious Fraud Office8 1 justified its decision for not
intervening in the Director's decision not to continue investigations into
an alleged bribery, based on a weighing of public interests. It decided
that the public interest in protecting British lives under threat by a
foreign nation that was against the investigations outweighed the public
83 Law Society ofSingapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [ 132].
84 [2007] 1 WLR 780 (on appeal from the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago).
85 Sharma v Browne-Antoine [2007] 1 WLR 780 at 787-788. See Matalulu v Director of
Public Prosecutions [2003] 4 LRC 712 at 735-736; Mohit v Director of Public
Prosecutions ofMauritius [2006] 1 WLR 3343 at [ 17].
86 Sharma v Browne-Antoine [2007] 1 WLR 780 at 787.
87 [2008] 3 WLR 568.
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interest in securing a conviction. It was argued that acting in the
interests of the public (in this case, the physical safety of the people)
should not amount to bad faith. As Baroness Hale said, there is a
distinction between safeguarding "the personal and the public interest"
[emphases added]."
30 The concept of "bad faith" underlies, and is consistent with, the
concept of malice in the civil actions of malicious prosecution and
misfeasance in public office, 9 which may be pursued, in principle,
against public prosecutors. Such consistency between the grounds for
judicial review and civil actions would not be unexpected." The civil
action arises when the prosecution of the plaintiff by the defendant was
made maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause," and
provided the prosecution was finally determined in the plaintiff's favour
(for instance, via an acquittal of the charges)92 Where the action in
malicious prosecution is against the Crown Prosecutor, the absence
of "reasonable or probable cause" refers solely to the Prosecution's
professional and objective assessment of the guilt of the accused person;
whether he subjectively believed in the guilt of the accused person is
irrelevant. On the other hand, the requirement of malice on the part of
the Prosecution demands proof that the Prosecutor was actuated by
improper considerations,94 which is similar to the concept of bad faith
sufficient for judicial review of prosecutorial discretion. For example,
where the Prosecutor distorted the accused person's words in order to
secure a conviction, this would amount to malice.95 Absence of honest
belief, though a relevant factor, is not by itself sufficient to found malice
where it is due, for instance, to the Prosecutor's incompetence or
negligence.96 In addition to malicious prosecution, actions for misfeasance
88 R (Corner House Research) v Serious Fraud Office [2008] 3 'WLR 568 at [53].
89 See generally Gary Chan Kok Yew, "Abuse of Process and Power: Malicious
Prosecution and Misfeasance in Public Office" in The Law of Torts in Singapore
(Academy Publishing, 2011) at pp 647-662.
90 However, precise congruence should not be required, given that the outcomes
for judicial review (setting aside of prosecutorial decision) and civil actions
(compensation via damages) are different.
91 The test is whether the defendant "believed that there was a case against the
[plaintiff] to be tried": see Zainal bin Kuning v Chan Sin Mian Michael [1996]
2 SLR(R) 858 (citing Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726, per Lords Devlin and
Denning).
92 Zainal bin Kuning v Chan Sin Mian Michael [ 1996] 2 SLR(R) 858. For UK, see Gray v
Crown Prosecution Office [2010] EWHC 2144 (QB) (where the action in malicious
prosecution failed on the elements).
93 Miazga v Kvello Estate [2009] 3 SCR 339.
94 Zainal bin Kuning v Chan Sin Mian Michael [ 1996] 2 SLR(R) 858 at [84].
95 Proulx v Quebec (Attorney-General) [2001] 3 SCR 9. Note that fraud or deceit on
the part of the Prosecution may amount to abuse of process: see The Queen v Hui
Chi-ming [1991] 2 HKLR 537 at 554 (Privy Council decision on appeal from Hong
Kong).
96 Miazga v Kvello Estate [2009] 3 SCR 339.
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in public office can be pursued against a prosecutor provided it is
proved that the Prosecutor has undertaken a prosecutorial decision
maliciously that would foreseeably cause damage to the plaintiff and the
plaintiff suffered actual damage."
III. Separation of powers, the presumption of constitutionality of
prosecutorial decisions and rebutting the presumption
31 The operation of the legal limits to prosecutorial discretion may
be better understood in light of two important constitutional rationales,
namely, the doctrines of separation of powers and the presumption
of constitutionality. Questions may be raised in respect of the
circumstances in which the presumption of constitutionality may arise
and the difficulties faced by the accused person who seeks to rebut the
presumption. The problems are exacerbated by the absence of an
obligation on the Prosecution's part to disclose the reasons for the
prosecutorial decisions."
A. Separation of powers
32 Both the Judiciary and the Prosecution are regarded as separate
powers and equal in status. The qualifications for the position of the
Attorney-General," the removal process.on and security in the terms of
service' are similar to those for a Supreme Court judge. Further,
Art 35(8) of the Constitution vests power in the Attorney-General to
make prosecutorial decisions, while Art 93102 of the Constitution
explicitly vests judicial power in the courts.1 3 As the powers are separate
97 Lines International Holding (S) Pte Ltd v Singapore Tourist Promotion [1997]
1 SLR(R) 52 (the defendants were statutory bodies). See the alternative test in the
subsequent House of Lords' decision in Three Rivers District Council v Governor
and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1. There are, as yet, no
cases in Singapore involving misfeasance in public office against prosecutors.
98 See paras 49-68 below.
99 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 35(1).
100 Removal of the Attorney-General for inability to discharge the functions of his
office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind, or any other cause) or for
misbehaviour is subject to the concurrence of the President and a tribunal
consisting of the Chief Justice and two Supreme Court justices: Constitution of the
Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 35(6).
101 The Attorney-General's terms of service cannot be altered to his disadvantage
during his office: Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint)
Art 35(12).
102 Article 93 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) reads:
The judicial power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in
such subordinate courts as may be provided by any written law for the time
being in force.
103 Judicial power depends on the existence of a controversy between a State or one or
more of its subjects, or between two or more subjects of a State, entails making a
(cont'd on the next page)
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and equal,104 the Judiciary cannot intervene or encroach upon the
Prosecutor's powers, save that the Judiciary has the power to prevent the
unconstitutional exercise of prosecutorial power.0 s This is because the
Constitution is the overarching and independent source of law, whereby
both organs have to abide. It should be highlighted that the Government
regards the doctrine of separation of powers as an important facet of the
Rule of Law.106
33 The doctrine of separation of powers was applied in Quek Hock
Lye, albeit with a twist. Quek's counsel argued that the Public
Prosecutor's actions in "manipulating" the quantity of drugs had
infringed Art 93 of the Constitution, which vests judicial power in the
courts.' The argument here is that the Prosecutor had interfered with
judicial power08 and thus the prosecutorial decision should be set aside.
The Court of Appeal rejected the argument as spurious, based on the
intrinsically different functions of the Prosecutor and the Judiciary,09
and explained the role of the courts as follows:1 o
[T]he question of usurpation of judicial power does not arise. It is
not the function of the court to prefer charges against an accused
brought before it. The court exercises its judicial power in relation to
finding of facts, applying law to the facts and determining the rights and
obligations of parties: see Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012]
SGHC 163 at [27].
104 Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] SGHC 163 at [ 16].
105 Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [43] (citing Law
Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [44], [144]).
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys [1976] 2 WLR 857 at 871,
Viscount Dilhorne said: "A judge must keep out of the arena. He should not have
or appear to have any responsibility for the institution of a prosecution"; and
at 896, per Lord Edmund-Davies: "Any such assertion of judicial omnipotence
must inevitably be unacceptable in any country acknowledging the supremacy of
the rule of law."
106 See K Shanmugam, Minister for Law, speech at New York State Bar Association
Rule of Law Plenary Session (28 October 2009) at [6]; see also Mohammad Faizal
bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] SGHC 163 at [19]; Director of Public
Prosecution ofJamaica v Mollison [2003] 2 AC 411 at [13].
107 Quek Hock Lye v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 1012 at [26].
108 See also Public Prosecutor v Dato Yap Peng [ 1987] 2 MLJ 311.
109 See Public Prosecutor v Norzian bin Bintat [1995] 3 SLR(R) 105 (that Art 35(8) of
the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore ("the Constitution") (1992 Reprint)
does not allow prosecutorial discretion where criminal proceedings were
terminated as a result of a judicial decision consenting to the composition of an
offence, given Art 93, which vests power in the judiciary). However, compounding
for certain offences specified in the Fourth Sched of the Criminal Procedure Code
2010 (Act 15 of 2010) is now allowed if the Public Prosecutor, instead of the courts,
consents to such composition. This is more in sync with the wide discretion
conferred under Art 35(8) of the Constitution (1999 Reprint): The Criminal
Procedure Code of Singapore - Annotations and Commentary (Jennifer Marie &
Mohamed Faizal Mohamed Abdul Kadir eds) (Academy Publishing, 2012) at p 353.
110 Quek Hock Lye v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 1012 at [28].
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the charge or charges brought by the Public Prosecutor against an
accused person.
34 Quek's counsel relied on Mohammed Muktar Ali v The Queen"'
("Mohammed Muktar Ali"). Under the Constitution of Mauritius," 2 the
Director of Public Prosecutions has the power to institute and
undertake criminal proceedings before any court. The Mauritius
Dangerous Drugs Act 19861" states that a person charged with the
offence of importation of drugs may be charged and tried at the
Supreme Court before a judge without a jury, or at the Intermediate or
the District Court "at the discretion of the Director of Public
Prosecutions", and that any person charged with the offence before a
judge without a jury and found to be a trafficker in drugs was to be
sentenced to death. Upon the direction of the Director of Public
Prosecutions, they were each tried in the Supreme Court before a judge
sitting without a jury and eventually convicted, found to be traffickers
and sentenced to death under s 38(4)" of the Dangerous Drugs
Act 1986. The defendants contended that the principle of the separation
of the powers implicit in the Constitution of Mauritius had been
breached. The Privy Council agreed, holding that as the Director of
Public Prosecutions possessed the discretion under the Mauritius
Dangerous Drugs Act 1986 to select the court in which a drug importer
should be tried and, in effect, to select the mandatory (death) penalty
to be imposed, s 38(4) was unconstitutional. As such, though the
convictions were upheld, the death sentences were set aside.
35 Mohammed Muktar Ali was, however, distinguished by the
Court of Appeal in Quek Hock Lye. The former case was concerned
with the constitutionality of a statute, and not the constitutionality of
prosecutorial discretion."'5 Mohammed Muktar Ali did not concern the
prosecutorial discretion to prefer a more serious or less serious charge
against an accused person as in Quek Hock Lye."'6 Further, as noted by
the Singapore Court of Appeal,"' Lord Keith in Mohammed Muktar Ali
clearly stated, "In general, there is no objection of a constitutional or
111 [1992]2AC93.
112 Constitution of Mauritius (1968) s 72(3)(a).
113 Dangerous Drugs Act 1986 (No 32 of 1986) s 28(8) (Mauritius).
114 Section 38(4) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1986 (No 32 of 1986) (Mauritius) reads:
Any person who is charged with an offence under section 28(1)(c) before a
judge without a jury and who is found to be a trafficker in drugs shall be
sentenced to death.
115 Quek Hock Lye v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 1012 at [31].
116 The legislation in Mohammed Muktar Ali v The Queen [1992] 2 AC 93 did not
stipulate any threshold quantity of drugs for the purposes of determining whether
prosecution should take place: Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor
[2012] SGHC 163 at [54].
117 Quek Hock Lye v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 1012 at [31].
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other nature to a prosecuting authority having a discretion of that
all8
nature.
36 Though Mohammed Muktar Ali was, strictly speaking, about the
constitutionality of a statute, it was substantively concerned with the
nature of the Prosecution's exercise of his discretion to select the court
that will try the offence. Ultimately, the legislative provision conferring
such a prosecutorial power to select the court was held to be
unconstitutional, as the effect of the provision was to leave the Supreme
Court with no choice but to mete out the death sentence, and hence it
had unlawfully encroached into the judicial arena. On the other hand, in
Quek Hock Lye, the focus was solely on the nature of the prosecutorial
decision to select the charge and offence on which the charge was based,
by specifying the quantity of the drugs. The nature of this prosecutorial
decision to select the charges was taken by the Court of Appeal to be
separate and distinct from the exercise of judicial power, which was to
decide whether the accused should be convicted and sentenced on those
charges, and hence there was no breach of separation of powers.
This conclusion was reached notwithstanding that the effect of the
prosecutorial decision, which was the mandatory death sentence meted
out by the Judiciary, was the same as in Mohammed Muktar Ali. Should
the substantive effect of a prosecutorial decision not be regarded as
more important than the nature of that decision?
B. Presumption of constitutionality of prosecutorial discretion
37 Due to the high office of the Attorney-General,"' there is a
judicial presumption that the prosecutorial decisions are constitutional
unless shown to be otherwise. The Court of Appeal in Ramalingam
added that the courts should "presume that [the Attorney-General] acts
in the public interest as the Public Prosecutor, and that he acts in
accordance with the law when exercising his prosecutorial power"2
Based on the judicial presumption, the burden lies with the defendant
to show that his prosecution was unconstitutional by producing
prima facie evidence of the alleged unconstitutionality. Only when this
has been shown will the Attorney-General have the evidential burden
to justify the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The Court of Appeal
in Ramalinam cited the case of United States v Christopher Lee
Armstrong,12 which involved an allegation of selective prosecution based
118 Mohammed MuktarAli v The Queen [ 1992] 2 AC 93 at 104.
119 Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General ("Ramalingam") [2012] 2 SLR 49
at [44]. See also Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189 at [139]
(cited in Ramalingam at [45]).
120 [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [46].
121 517 US 456 (1996) (Justice Stevens dissenting) (at 465: to show discriminatory
effect under US equal protection law, the claimant must show that similarly
(cont'd on the next page)
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on race, that in order to override the presumption that a prosecutor has
not violated equal protection, the defendant must present clear evidence
to the contrary.122
38 The Court of Appeal drew an analogy between the presumption
of the constitutionality of prosecutorial discretion and statute. As stated
by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Lee Keng Guan v Public Prosecutor1 2 3
("Lee Keng Guan"), applying the Indian case of Shri Ram Krishna
Dalmia v Shri Justice S R Tendolkar" ("Ram Krishna Dalmia"), the
rationale for the presumption of constitutionality of a statute is that
"the courts [presume] that the legislature understands and correctly
appreciates the need of its own people, and that laws are directed to
problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are
based on adequate grounds" 12 5 In Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong
("Taw Cheng Kong"), the Court of Appeal explained the heavy burden of
displacing the presumption:126
[I] t seemed to us that, unless the law is plainly arbitrary on its face,
postulating examples of arbitrariness would ordinarily not be helpful in
rebutting the presumption of constitutionality. This is because another
court or person can well postulate an equal number if not more examples
to show that the law did not operate arbitrarily. If postulating examples
of arbitrariness can always by themselves be sufficient for purposes of
rebuttal, then it will hardly be giving effect to the presumption that
Parliament knows best for its people, that its laws are directed at
problems made manifest by experience, and hence its differentiation is
based on adequate grounds. Therefore, to discharge the burden of
rebutting the presumption, it will usually be necessary for the person
challenging the law to adduce some material or factual evidence to show
that it was enacted arbitrarily or had operated arbitrarily. Otherwise,
there will be no practical difference between the presumption and the
ordinary burden of proof on the person asserting unconstitutionality.
[emphases added]
39 However, it should be noted that there are limits to such
presumption of constitutionality of statutes. There were statements in
situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted). In United States v Bass
536 US 862 (2002), it was held that nationwide statistics showing that the US
charges blacks with death-eligible offence more than twice as often as it charges
whites did not satisfy the United States v Christopher Lee Armstrong 517 US 456
(1996) requirement as to "similarly situated defendants".
122 See United States v Chemical Foundation Inc 272 US 1 at 14-15 (1926) (on the
presumption as applied to public officers generally).
123 [1977-1978] SLR(R) 78.
124 1958 AIR SC 538.
125 [1977-1978] SLR(R) 78 at [19].
126 [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 at [80]. See also Johari bin Kanadi v Public Prosecutor [2008]
2 SLR(R) 422 at [10] (that the person alleging unequal protection has to show that
the statutory provision or exercise of power was "arbitrary and unsupportable").
34 (2013) 25 SAcLJ
Prosecutorial Discretion and the
(2013) 25 SAcLJ Legal Limits in Singapore 35
Ram Krishna Dalmia, cited in Lee Keng Guan1 27 and Taw Cheng Kong,128
that the presumption does not extend so far as to assume the existence
of reasons that were not disclosed or known:129
... that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on
the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the
face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice
of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as
based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the
extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and
unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporation to
hostile or discriminating legislation. [emphasis added]
40 If the above qualification were applied to the issue of the
constitutionality of prosecutorial discretion, the decision of the
Prosecutor cannot always be presumed to be constitutional if some
undisclosed and unknown reasons exist. Further, with specific reference
to Ramalingam and Quek Hock Lye, one cannot presume that
prosecutorial discretion was exercised constitutionally if there might be
reasons that were not disclosed by the Prosecutor for the differential
charging of co-offenders involved in the same criminal enterprise.
Hence, the strength of the presumption of constitutionality depends
to some extent on the availability of reasons for the prosecutorial
decision. However, this point was not raised in either Ramalingam or
Quek Hock Lye.
C. Rebutting the presumption
41 In order to rebut the presumption of constitutionality, the
accused shoulders the burden of adducing sufficient prima facie
evidence of unconstitutionality. In Ramalingam, the court decided that
the applicant had not produced evidence to show a prima facie case of a
breach of Art 12 to rebut the presumption of constitutionality, and that
the evidence on record did not show that the co-offender was more
culpable than Ramalingam in relation to the drug trafficking offences.
According to the Court of Appeal in Quek Hock Lye, Quek had not
shown sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of unconstitutionality,
and that "Quek was really the brain behind the criminal enterprise and
thus the main culprit".'o The mere fact of a difference in the charges
against the co-defendants per se did not constitute prima facie evidence
of bias or taking into account irrelevant considerations by the
127 Lee Keng Guan v Public Prosecutor [ 1977-1978] SLR(R) 78 at [ 19].
128 Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [ 1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 at [79].
129 Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice SR Tendolkar 1958 AIR SC 538; 1959 SCR 279
at 297-298.
130 Quek Hock Lye v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 1012 at [25].
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Prosecution. 13' How then does one show prima facie evidence sufficient
to rebut the presumption of constitutionality of prosecutorial
discretion? There seem to be three interrelated methods to rebut the
presumption, as gleaned from the Singapore decisions, but none of
them is free from difficulties.
42 One example was supplied by the Court of Appeal in
Ramalingam in its examination of Teh Cheng Poh. The Court of Appeal
stated that the appellant in that case would have been able to "show
prima facie impropriety by producing evidence that another offender in
similar circumstances had been prosecuted for a non-capital offence" 132
It seems that the phrase "had been prosecuted" would suggest that the
similar circumstances must be based on past events and not some
hypothetical event. In Teh Cheng Poh, the offender, the reader would
recall, was prosecuted for a capital offence despite the availability of
prosecution for a non-capital offence. One question that arises is how
Teh Cheng Poh may be compared with the Ramalingam situation. As
Ramalingam concerned a case of co-defendants charged with different
offences, it should suffice, for purposes of rebutting the presumption,
if the applicant was able to produce evidence that another set of
co-defendants in similar circumstances was charged with the same
offence. If so, the applicant should be able to rebut the presumption so
that the Attorney-General will have to justify his prosecutorial decision.
What is meant by "similar circumstances"? The scope of the phrase
seems fairly elastic, though it should include the circumstances leading
to the commission of the offences by the co-offenders and the relative
roles of the co-offenders in the criminal activities. Thus, whether the
accused person can rebut the presumption in a particular case would
depend heavily on the availability of suitable precedents (which may or
may not exist for a particular offence, or if they do exist, may not be
publicly available or accessible to the accused or counsel) and the scope
of the court's interpretation of "similar circumstances".
43 Another method of rebutting the presumption suggested by the
Court of Appeal in Ramalingam3 is that the offender who alleges a
breach of Art 12 has to prove that "there are no valid grounds" for the
differentiation in the charges between co-offenders. However, it is
difficult to prove a negative condition, that is, the lack of grounds or
reasons. In order to prove such negative conditions, the accused would
probably need to know the reasons for the prosecution in the first place.
As it stands, there is no obligation on the Prosecution to divulge
his reasons for a particular prosecutorial decision undertaken. 134 An
131 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR49 at [70].
132 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [26].
133 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR49 at [70].
134 See paras 49-68 below.
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alternative interpretation may be that the accused person would have to
prove that all the relevant factors determining the charges fall equally as
between the co-offenders, and that there should therefore not be any
difference in the charges. However, given the non-exhaustive list of
factors, this burden of proof is not easily discharged.
44 A third possible approach mentioned in Ramalingam is that an
offender can prove a case of unlawful discrimination if "a less culpable
offender is charged with a more serious offence while his more culpable
co-offender is charged with a less serious offence, when there are no
other facts to show a lawful differentiation between their respective
charges" [emphasis added] .1 This is akin to the Thiruselvam case
discussed above, and involves the assessment of the relative roles of the
co-offenders. While the second method above relates to the proof of the
absence of grounds or reasons, this third method involves the proof of
an absence of facts. One question is whether the proviso as to the
absence of facts should be proved by the accused person. Similar to the
argument above, it would be overly onerous for the accused person to
prove the absence of facts indicating a lawful differentiation in the
charges. On the question of relative culpability, the court had also stated
that, even if both the co-offenders in Ramalingam were equally culpable,
that would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption.13 One would
have thought that if both co-offenders were equally culpable, the
differential charging decision of the Prosecution would, all other things
being equal, raise a prima facie case of unconstitutionality that demands
an explanation from the Prosecution. Otherwise, the odds would be
heavily stacked against the accused person seeking to challenge a
prosecutorial decision.
45 Subsequent to Ramalingam and Quek Hock Lye, the issue of the
relative culpability of co-offenders arose in the Court of Appeal decision
of Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor. 1 Between the two co-offenders for
drug trafficking offences, Chia, the boss and supplier of the drugs to
Yong, was more culpable than Yong. A total of 26 charges (including
three capital charges) were levelled by the Prosecution against Chia. One
of the capital charges against Chia was for instigating Yong to transport
diamorphine into Singapore. The Prosecution subsequently decided
that there was insufficient evidence against Chia and applied for a
discontinuance not amounting to an acquittal ("DNAQ"). While Chia
was later detained under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions)
Act,138 Yong was convicted of trafficking diamorphine and sentenced to
death. Following the decision in Ramalingam, Yong challenged the
135 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR49 at [71].
136 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [73].
137 [2012] 2 SLR 872 at [28].
138 Cap 67, 2000 Rev Ed.
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prosecution decision as a violation of Art 12 of the Constitution.139 The
court, however, dismissed the constitutional challenge, on the basis that
Yong has not proved that the Prosecution had abused its power in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner, or had failed to consider certain
relevant factors prior to the prosecutorial decision. In fact, the
Prosecution had explained that its application for DNAQ was due to
insufficient evidence against Chia.
46 Another difficulty faced by the accused in rebutting the
presumption relates to the nature and scope of the factors to be
considered in prosecutorial decision-making. The Court of Appeal in
Ramalingam referred to the obligation of the Prosecution to consider the
following factors in the exercise of prosecutorial power:
... in addition to the legal guilt of the offender, his moral
blameworthiness, the gravity of the harm caused to the public welfare
by his criminal activity and a myriad of other factors, including
whether there is sufficient evidence141' against a particular offender,
whether the offender is willing to cooperate with the law enforcement
authorities in providing intelligence, whether one offender is willing to
testify against his co-offenders,"2 and so on - up to and including and
even the possibility of showing some degree of compassion in certain
cases.
47 Apart from the fact that the above list of factors is non-exhaustive,
it should be highlighted that some of the factors are subjective in nature
(such as the assessment of the moral blameworthiness of the accused
person and the possibility of showing compassion in individual cases).
It would be difficult for the accused person to rebut the presumption if
the Prosecution is given wide discretion in weighing these subjective
factors prior to making prosecutorial decisions.
139 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint).
140 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [63].
141 See R v The Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Patricia Manning [2001] QB 330
at [23], per Lord Bingham CJ (that the Director of Public Prosecutions' decision
depends on "the exercise of an informed judgment of how a case against a
particular defendant, if brought, would be likely to fare in the context of a criminal
trial" and involves an "assessment of the strength, by the end of the trial, of the
evidence against the defendant and of the likely defences").
142 The Court of Appeal in Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012]
2 SLR 49 at [78] interpreted the co-offender's willingness to give evidence for the
Prosecution against the applicant as a factor for the differential charges, even
though the Attorney-General did not disclose his reasons. On the other hand, in
Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 872 at [25], [30], [35], Yong's
unwillingness to testify against Chia, his boss and supplier of drugs, was relevant to
the Prosecution's assessment not to call Yong as a witness against Chia. In any
event, the purported usefulness of Yong as a prosecution witness in securing Chia's
conviction (as opposed to the application of a discontinuance not amounting to an
acquittal) was not proved. Therefore, the Prosecution's failure to compel Yong to
testify against Chia was not an abuse of discretion.
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48 It is argued that the courts should limit the prosecutorial
discretion in considering the above factors in at least one respect. On the
issue of whether the offender is willing to co-operate with law
enforcement authorities or to testify against his co-offenders, the
Prosecutor should be obliged, in the interests of impartiality and
consistency, to consider whether to offer the same opportunities to both
co-offenders to co-operate or testify against his co-offender, unless there
are good reasons as to why an offender should not be offered those
opportunities in a particular case. Moreover, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that one of the motivations behind an
offender's efforts to co-operate with law enforcement authorities or
testify against co-offenders might be to serve his own vested interests,
even at the expense of the other co-offender. Though such co-operation
and testimonies of offenders are important in order to further police
investigations and the Prosecutor's aim of enforcing the criminal law in
Singapore, the emphasis on impartiality and consistency in the
treatment of the co-offenders would ensure that the prosecutorial
function and objective are carried out in a fair and just manner.
IV. Whether the Prosecutor should disclose the reasons for the
prosecutorial decision
49 The Court of Appeal in Ramalingam had highlighted that the
Attorney-General's decision would be constrained by "what the public
interest requires" 14 ' As a "custodian" of prosecutorial power, the
Attorney-General is required to use that power to enforce the criminal
law for public good, that is, to maintain law and order and to uphold
the rule of law.' How then can the Judiciary ensure that the
Prosecution's obligation to consider the relevant factors, as well as
public interest in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, is duly
discharged in a particular case?
50 There appear to be three potential restrictions. First, the court
cannot intervene in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion unless the
failure of the Prosecution to consider the factors amounts to a breach of
constitutional rights or bad faith. Second, to the extent that certain
factors are subjective in nature, it may be difficult to determine with
certainty whether a subjective factor has been properly considered by
143 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR49 at [53].
144 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [53]; see R v Power
(1994) 89 CCC (3d) 1 at [17], per L'Heureux-Dub6 J (La Forest, Gonthier and
McLachlin JJ concurring): "The Attorney General is a member of the executive and
as such reflects, through his or her prosecutorial function, the interest of the
community to see that justice is properly done. The Attorney General's role in this
regard is not only to protect the public, but also to honour and express the
community's sense of justice."
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the Prosecution. Third, the court may not be in a position to assess
whether the factors have indeed been taken into account if the
Prosecution decides to keep the reasons for prosecution under wraps
and the accused person is unable to adduce prima facie evidence of
unconstitutionality. Indeed, as discussed above, the capacity of the
accused person to raise such prima facie evidence may be hampered, in
part at least, by the lack of transparency as to the underlying reasons for
the prosecution in the first place.
51 Be that as it may, the court in Ramalingam agreed with the
Attorney-General that there is no general obligation to disclose his
reasons for making any particular prosecutorial decision. The
applicant's counsel had initially argued for the Prosecution to disclose
the reasons for the charging decisions but subsequently withdrew the
argument. The court observed that this position of non-disclosure is
consistent with the English position in R v Secretary of State for the
Home Department ex parte Doodus ("Doody"). It should, however, be
highlighted that Doody was not, strictly speaking, a case on the
obligation to disclose reasons in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
It was concerned with the Secretary of State's review of a prisoner's
period of sentence upon consultation with the Lord Chief Justice under
the Criminal Justice Act 1967,4 and specifically, whether the Secretary
of State was obliged to give reasons if he departed from the judicial
recommendation. In any event, there was, on the facts, a duty to disclose
the reasons. Lord Mustill in Doody opined that there was a duty to
disclose reasons where fairness requires it.147 The English Court of
Appeal in Doody also cited R v Civil Service Appeal Board ex parte
Cunningham" ("Cunningham") for the proposition that, though there
is no general obligation to give reasons for an "administrative decision",
such a duty may in appropriate circumstances be implied."
Cunningham concerned the decisions made by the Civil Service Appeal
Board, a public law judicial tribunal, on the award of compensation to
an officer who was dismissed from his post. Further, while it is true that
there is no general duty to give reasons for a decision under
administrative law unless this is required by statute, there appears to be
a perceptible trend in England towards requiring decision-makers to
provide reasons."'
145 [1994]1 AC 531.
146 c 80 (UK).
147 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department exparte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at 564.
148 [1992] ICR 816.
149 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department exparte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at 564.
150 See Peter Leyland & Gordon Anthony, Textbook on Administrative Law (Oxford
University Press, 6th Ed, 2009) at pp 371-376.
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52 The applicant in Ramalingam had, on the other hand, cited R v
Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Manning'" ("Manning") in
support of his argument (which was subsequently withdrawn). The
Director of Public Prosecutions in Manning decided not to prosecute N
in connection with the death of the applicant's brother. The court stated
that, while there is no general obligation for the Prosecution to give
reasons for his decision, 1 2 the Director of Public Prosecutions would be
expected, in the absence of compelling grounds to the contrary, to give
reasons for his decision not to prosecute N. This was because the case
involved the right to life, which is one of the most fundamental human
rights in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms.'s" As certain factors relating to the
prospects of success of a prosecution if brought were not taken into
account against N, the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions
was quashed. However, the Court of Appeal in Ramalingam downplayed
the significance of Manning, highlighting one part of the judgment in
Manning-154
[T]he effect of this decision is not to require the Director [of Public
Prosecutions] to prosecute. It is to require reconsideration of the
decision whether or not to prosecute. On the likely or proper outcome
of that reconsideration we express no opinion at all.
53 The Court of Appeal further distinguished Manning, as both the
co-offenders in Ramalingam have already been prosecuted and
convicted of the drug trafficking offences. As the applicant could have
raised the objection against the prosecution at the point when he was
prosecuted for the offence but did not do so, the Court of Appeal felt
that there were no compelling reasons to require the Prosecution to
explain its reasons for prosecuting the applicant at the subsequent stage
of the proceedings.15
54 There are two points to note. First, in view of the gravity of the
matter involving one of life and death, the fact that the objection was
raised at the appeal stage should not, by itself, justify the conclusion that
there are no compelling reasons to require the Prosecution's disclosure
of reasons. In this regard, the accused person should not have been
prejudiced. Second, though the facts in Manning concerning the
151 [2001] QB 330. See generally Mandy Burton, "Reviewing Crown Prosecution
Service Decisions not to Prosecute" (2001) Crim L Rev 374.
152 See Mohit v Director ofPublic Prosecutions ofMauritius [2006] 1 WLR 3343 at [21].
153 Entered into force on 3 September 1953. The court also stated that the giving of
reasons was "to meet the reasonable expectation of interested parties", given that
the coroner's inquest into the death led to the jury verdict of an unlawful killing
that implicated a clearly identified person: R v Director of Public Prosecutions
exparte Manning [2001] QB 330 at [33].
154 R v Director of Public Prosecutions exparte Manning [2001] QB 330 at [42].
155 Ramalingam Ravinthran vAttorney-General [2012] 2 SLR49 at [77].
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decision whether to prosecute are different from those in Ramalingam,
the central question is the same, namely, whether there are
circumstances in which the Prosecution should be obliged to give
reasons for the prosecutorial decision in question.
55 Apart from the cases examined above, the Court of Appeal did
not explain in detail the rationales for adopting the non-disclosure
position, given that there was no "live" dispute since the applicant's
counsel had withdrawn his argument. Nonetheless, the Attorney-
General's Chambers have, in the wake of the Ramalingam decision,
released a report... explaining why the current position on non-disclosure
of reasons for prosecution cases should be maintained:
[Prosecution] is a function entrusted to the executive branch of
government and it is exercised with access to material that the judicial
branch would not always have. Indeed, there is a broad range of
factors and information, including not only traditional forms of
evidence but also intelligence and other sensitive information that are
relevant to the making of such decisions.
Any requirement for reasons to be given in every case would also delay
criminal proceedings and undermine prosecutorial effectiveness.
Delay and ineffectiveness is likely to result as the publication of
reasons for all cases would likely lead to frequent challenge in the
courts by persons unhappy with specific decisions. Each decision
considers multiple factors; it is unlikely that any decision will be able
to satisfy all parties.
56 The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Power15 also expressed
support for non-disclosure on the following bases: disclosure will
(a) generate more documentation and review work; (b) reveal the
Prosecutor's "confidential strategies and preoccupations"; (c) generate
more challenges against the exercise of prosecutorial discretion via
judicial review; (d) discourage prosecutors from formulating or
changing policies; and (e) promote inflexibility in decision- and policy-
making.'5 ' The reasons (a) to (c) above are similar to those expressed by
the Attorney-General's Chambers' report. While the consequences
arising from (a), (b) and (c) may be undesirable, they should be
weighed against the potential benefits of uncovering a breach of
156 See Attorney-General's Chambers, "The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion",
press release (20 January 2012) <http://app.ag.gov.sg/DATA/O/Docs/NewsFiles/
AGCPressRelease200l12-THEEXERCISEOFPROSECUTORIALDISCRETION.pdf>
(accessed 11 January 2013).
157 (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 1.
158 R v Power (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 1 at [44]. Arguments (c) and (d) were based on
the remarks of Richard S Frase, "The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges:
A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion" (1980) 47 U Chi L Rev 246.
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constitutional rights or bad faith on the part of the Prosecution. As for
(d) and (e), it is true that the obligation to disclose reasons would
render prosecutorial decision-making more inflexible and discourage
policy-making, on the assumption that prosecutorial decisions must be
made in a consistent manner. However, consistency in prosecutorial
practice is not altogether a bad thing, provided there is ample room to
take account of particular factors pertaining to the case at hand.
57 The Attorney-General's Chambers' report also explained why
their internal guidelines are not published to the general public,
and that the Prosecution does not generally disclose reasons for
prosecutorial decisions:5 9
(a) in evaluating whether it is in the public interest to
take a particular prosecution decision, the Attorney-General
considers a large number of often competing interests,
including those of the victim, the accused person and society as
a whole;
(b) non-disclosure enables the Attorney-General's Chambers
to retain flexibility to depart from the guidelines when the
interests of justice call for this in any given case, while keeping
to a broadly consistent path;
(c) any attempt to publish guidelines is likely to result in
vague guidelines, which would in turn have the undesirable
effect of reducing, rather than enhancing, consistency; and
(d) the publication of specific guidelines would identify
prosecution priorities, as well as areas where the Prosecution
might exercise restraint, which may lead to an increase in
offending in those specific areas.
58 Notwithstanding the practical arguments raised above for
non-disclosure of reasons, whether for specific prosecution cases or in
terms of general guidelines, there nevertheless remain areas of concern.
First, there is a danger that, without any obligation to provide any
reasons, the powers of judicial review, restricted as they are currently to
breach of constitutional rights and bad faith, would be further diluted.
It has been argued that "[w]ithout requirements for reasons and
guidelines to identify what reasons are inadequate and improper, the
promise of judicial review will remain illusory"."s As explained earlier,
159 See Attorney-General's Chambers, "The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion",
press release (20 January 2012) <http://app.agc.gov.sg/DATA/0/Docs/NewsFiles/
AGCPressRelease20012-THEEXERCISEOFPROSECUTORIALDISCRETION.pdf>
(accessed 11 January 2013).
160 Kent Roach, "The Attorney General and the Charter Revisited" (2000) 50 U Tor LJ 1
at 30.
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the constitutional limits to prosecutorial discretion and the capacity of
the accused person to displace the presumption of constitutionality
depend considerably on the accused's accessibility to, and knowledge of,
the Prosecution's reasons for the charges brought against him.
59 Second, there might be a problem of a lack of public trust and
potential risks from wrong prosecutorial decisions. An Opposition
Member of Parliament raised a pertinent query in Parliament, that
"taking public interest into account, would not disclosure by the
Attorney-General also engender greater trust in the legal system, and in
the office of the Attorney-General?" In reply, the Minister for Law
assessed the potential risks as follows: 16 2
[T]here are these two situations, the risk of the prosecution acting
wrongly, compared to the risks associated with the compromise of
intelligence and all the other attendant risks if disclosure is made.
Which is the more serious risk in the context?
Our view is that the prosecution acting wrongly or maliciously is the
lesser of the two risks.
60 The Minister added that there are other layers of checks, such as
the Attorney-General's Chambers' internal guidelines and review
processes, and that "if a prosecutorial decision is untenable on its face, it
must be explained, or else the Court will infer that there is no good
reason for it"" However, as discussed above, the Court of Appeal had
emphasised the presumption of constitutionality of prosecutorial
discretion to begin with. The burden is on the accused, not the
Prosecution, to raise prima facie evidence to rebut the presumption. The
Prosecution does not have to "explain" unless and until the accused
adduces sufficient prima facie evidence. Further, a difference on the face
of the charges against co-offenders per se is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption.
61 As highlighted by the Minister and Prosecution, it is true that
there are risks associated with the disclosure of reasons by the
Prosecution. On the other side of the risk equation, however, one
important question that should be asked is whether the current risks of
the Prosecutor acting wrongly are acceptable or may be ameliorated. In
this regard, it must be remembered that the life and liberty of accused
161 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, "Head R - Ministry of Law
(Committee of Supply)" (6 March 2012), vol 88 (Pritam Singh).
162 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Offcial Report, "Head R - Ministry of Law
(Committee of Supply)" (6 March 2012), vol 88 (K Shanmugam, Minister for
Law).
163 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Offcial Report, "Head R - Ministry of Law
(Committee of Supply)" (6 March 2012), vol 88 (K Shanmugam, Minister for
Law).
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persons, who bear the brunt of any prosecutorial errors, are at stake.
Due to the need to ensure that the limited constitutional and legal
checks on prosecutorial powers are not illusory, the desirability of
enhancing public trust in the prosecutorial system and the quest for a
more judicious balance of the potential risks involved, given that the life
and liberty of accused persons are at stake, it is proposed that some
adjustments should be made, with a view to easing the heavy burden of
the accused person in rebutting the presumption of constitutionality of
prosecutorial discretion.
62 As discussed above, prima facie evidence that the co-offenders
are equally culpable should suffice to rebut the presumption. There
should not be a need to show that the offender, who is challenging the
conviction, played a lesser role or was less culpable than the co-offender.
Further, the requirement to adduce evidence of other offenders in
"similar circumstances" should be construed broadly rather than strictly
against the accused person. The burden of the accused person is merely
to prove a prima facie case, not to provide conclusive evidence, so that
the Prosecution would have the onus to explain the prosecutorial
decision. In this regard, it should also be noted that the strength of the
presumption, analogous to the presumption of constitutionality of
statutes, is not unrelated to the underlying reasons for the prosecutorial
decision. To the extent that there are unknown or undisclosed reasons
for the prosecutorial decision, the presumption of its constitutionality
would appear weak. Further, the Prosecutor should, as a default
position, consider offering the same opportunities to both co-offenders
to co-operate or testify against his co-offender, subject to extenuating
circumstances in a particular case.
63 Further, while it is acknowledged that there is no legal burden
to disclose the reasons for every prosecutorial decision, in view of
the discretion conferred on the Attorney-General and in light of
the prevailing case law, there are good arguments based on public
confidence in the administration of criminal justice, fairness and
consistency, the life and liberty of the accused persons and the onerous
burden on the accused person to supply the reasons as far as possible. In
fact, the Attorney-General's Chambers have on occasion given specific
reasons in particular cases of prosecution, to clarify the factors and
reasons for the specific prosecutorial decisions, and the Government
164 See Attorney-General's Chambers, "Justice, Compassion and Prosecutorial
Discretion" (18 September 2008) <http://www.webcitation.org/5oxuxhaqJ>
(accessed 11 January 2013); see also Public Prosecutor v Tang Wee Sung [2008]
SGDC 262 and Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 872.
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has also announced a policy that it will not proactively enforce
particular criminal law provisions.s
64 On the question of publication of general guidelines, there are
some merits in greater disclosure of the factors underlying prosecutorial
discretion, provided the risks of disclosure (such as the disclosure of
sensitive information and intelligence), as highlighted in the Attorney-
General Chambers' report, are avoided. Developed common law
jurisdictions such as the UK, Australia,'6 Canada16 7 and Hong Kong 168
have issued public codes to guide the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. It is noted that the publication of guidelines to enhance
fairness and consistency would be in line with the UN Guidelines on the
Role of Prosecutors.
65 With respect to the UK Crown Prosecution Service's Code for
Crown Prosecutors ("CPS Code"), which was issued by the Director of
Public Prosecutions pursuant to UK legislation, 70 the English judges and
165 See Michael Hor, "Changing Criminal Law - Singapore Style" in Lives in the Law:
Essays in Honour of Peter Ellinger, Koh Kheng Lian and Tan Sook Yee (Dora Neo,
Tang Hang Wu & Michael Hor eds) (Faculty of Law, National University of
Singapore and Academy Publishing, 2007) at p 124.
166 Australia has issued a code or policy on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion "to
promote consistency in the making of the various decisions which arise in the
institution and conduct of prosecutions ... The Policy also serves to inform the
public and practitioners of the principles which guide the decisions made by the
[Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions]": Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions, "Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth" (November 2008)
<http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/ProsecutionPolicy/> (accessed 11 January
2013).
167 See Federal Prosecution Service, Department of Justice Canada, "The Decision to
Prosecute" (Part V, ch 15) in The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook (2000)
<http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/fps-sfp/fpd/chl5.html> (accessed 11 January
2013).
168 See The Department of Justice of Hong Kong SAR, "The Statement of Prosecution
Policy and Practice - Code for Prosecutors" (2009) <http://www.doj.gov.hkleng/
public/pdf/2008/dpp20081223e.pdf> (accessed 11 January 2013). See also
Department of Justice for HK SAR, "The Policy for Prosecuting Cases Involving
Domestic Violence" (2006) <http://www.doj.gov.hkleng/public/pubppcdv.html>
(accessed 11 January 2013).
169 Article 17 of the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (adopted in 1990) stipulates:
In countries where prosecutors are vested with discretionary functions, the
law or published rules or regulations shall provide guidelines to enhance
fairness and consistency of approach in taking decisions in the prosecution
process, including institution or waiver of prosecution.
170 The Crown Prosecution Service ("CPS") published the Code for Crown
Prosecutors in 1986, with subsequent editions, with the latest in 2010 (6th Ed):
see CPS, "Code for Crown Prosecutors" (February 2010) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/
publications/docs/code2010english.pdf> (accessed 11 January 2013). The Code
for Crown Prosecutors was issued pursuant to s 10 of the Prosecution of Offences
Act 1985 (c 23) (UK). Section 10(1) of the Act reads:
(cont'd on the next page)
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commentators have highlighted the merits and virtues of having a
public code: to promote consistency of practice; to serve as a "valuable
safeguard for the vulnerable";1 71 to warn the people "so that, if they are
of a law-abiding persuasion, they can behave accordingly";172 to reduce
"uncertainty"; to fulfil "the reasonable expectations of interested
parties";" to achieve the goals of "public interest in fair, consistent
and principled decision-making" ;17' and for "policy guidance and
accountability".17 6 In this regard, it is also pertinent to point out that
the CPS Code has undergone public consultation and incorporated
public views.177 Moreover, the issuance of the CPS Code on particular
areas pertaining to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion does not
preclude the Prosecutor's reliance on internal guidelines with respect to
other sensitive prosecutorial matters (impacting on national security, for
instance) that should be concealed from the public.178
66 There is no clear-cut answer as to the appropriate flexibility
and specificity of guidelines as referred to in the Attorney-General
Chambers' report. The content of guidelines, if any, would probably be
informed by the internal guidelines, practices, processes and the
collective experiences and wisdom of the prosecutors in the Attorney-
General Chambers. Contrary to the report, it is argued that, while the
ideal of perfect clarity and consensus as to the guidelines would be
utopian, the publication of guidelines would not necessarily lead to
vagueness or reduction in consistency.
67 One possible example is offered by the CPS Code. What the CPS
Code outlines, and this is broadly similar to that employed in the above
The Director shall issue a Code for Crown Prosecutors giving guidance on
general principles to be applied by them -
(a) in determining, in any case -
(i) whether proceedings for an offence should be instituted
or, where proceedings have been instituted, whether they should be
discontinued; or
(ii) what charges should be preferred.
171 R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] 1 AC 345
at [54], per Lord Phillips.
172 R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] 1 AC 345
at [59], per Baroness Hale.
173 R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] 1 AC 345
at [16], per Lord Phillips.
174 R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Manning [2001] QB 330 at 347.
175 Andrew Ashworth, "The 'Public Interest' Element in Prosecutions" [1987] Crim
L Rev 595 at 606.
176 Andrew Ashworth, "The 'Public Interest' Element in Prosecutions" [1987] Crim
L Rev 595 at 606.
177 Roger Daw & Alex Solomon, "Assisted Suicide and Identifying the Public Interest
in the Decision to Prosecute" [2010] Crim L Rev 737 at 743.
178 Andrew Ashworth & Julia Fionda, "The New Code for Crown Prosecutors: (Part 1)
Prosecution, Accountability and the Public Interest" [1994] Crim L Rev 894 at 900.
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common law jurisdictions, is a two-pronged test: (a) whether there
is sufficient evidence to justify prosecution; and (b) whether the
Prosecution is required in the public interest.17 9 With respect to the
evidential test in (a), the Prosecutor must be satisfied that there is
sufficient evidence to "provide a realistic prospect of conviction" against
the suspect on each charge."'o On the question of sufficiency of evidence,
the Prosecutor has to consider whether the evidence can be used and
whether it is reliable."' With regard to the public interest criterion
in (b), the CPS Code appears to adopt a presumptive position in favour
of prosecution subject to countervailing public interest. It states that
"a prosecution will usually take place unless the prosecutor is sure that
there are public interest factors tending against prosecution which
outweigh those tending in favour".18 2 It is not a factor-counting exercise
but more of a balancing act requiring a judgment that is sensitive to the
myriad facts.1 3 The various public interest factors tending towards
prosecutionl84 and those tending against prosecution..s are explicitly set
out in the CPS Code.
68 The publication of guidelines, such as the CPS Code, may be
undertaken with a view to engendering "greater openness and
accountability"18' on prosecutorial decisions. Prosecutorial decisions in
the UK are reviewable where the decision in question was clearly
179 See generally Andrew Ashworth & Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Oxford
University Press, 4th Ed, 2010) at pp 193-227.
180 Crown Prosecution Service, "Code for Crown Prosecutors" (February 2010)
at para 4.5. This is an "objective test" based solely upon the Prosecutor's
assessment of the evidence and any information that he has about the defence that
might be put forward by the suspect: at para 4.6.
181 Crown Prosecution Service, "Code for Crown Prosecutors" (February 2010)
at para 4.7.
182 Crown Prosecution Service, "Code for Crown Prosecutors" (February 2010)
at para 4.12.
183 Crown Prosecution Service, "Code for Crown Prosecutors" (February 2010)
at para 4.13: "Each case must be considered on its own facts and on its own merits.
Prosecutors must decide the importance of each public interest factor in the
circumstances of each case and go on to make an overall assessment."
184 Examples include the following: conviction is likely to result in a significant
sentence, the offence involved the use of a weapon or the threat of violence, the
offence was committed against a person serving the public, the offence was
premeditated, and there are grounds for believing that the offence is likely to be
continued or repeated: Crown Prosecution Service, "Code for Crown Prosecutors"
(February 2010) at para 4.16.
185 Examples include the following: the court is likely to impose a nominal penalty, the
offence was committed as a result of a genuine mistake or misunderstanding, the
suspect played a minor role in the commission of the offence and a prosecution
may require details to be made public that could harm sources of information,
international relations or national security: Crown Prosecution Service, "Code for
Crown Prosecutors" (February 2010) at para 4.17.
186 See generally Andrew Ashworth & Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Oxford
University Press, 4th Ed, 2010) at pp 193-227.
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contrary to the CPS Code.' Notwithstanding that the CPS Code has
generated satellite litigation pertaining to the Code provisions 8 and
concomitant costs," 9 it should be highlighted that it would be rare, in
practice, for a prosecutorial decision to be set aside on the above
ground.90 This is consistent with the general approach that the power of
judicial interventions in prosecutorial decisions should be sparingly
exercised. Finally, the CPS Code (and, for that matter, public guidelines
on prosecutorial discretion generally) are not writ in stone. The
contents of public codes may be reviewed and fine-tuned in light of
experience and societal circumstances'9 as well as inputs from the
courts, lawyers and members of the public.
V. Conduding remarks
69 Prosecutorial discretion is wide but not unfettered in Singapore.
The wide discretion of prosecutorial discretion (and narrow scope of
judicial intervention) is justified by the doctrine of separation of
powers. As the Judiciary and the Prosecution are regarded as
independent, separate and equal powers, the prosecutorial powers,
though broad in scope, can be checked by the Judiciary in limited
and specified circumstances. The doctrine of presumption of
constitutionality of prosecutorial discretion, which is premised on
the Attorney-General's constitutional high office, means that he is
presumed to act in the public interest in prosecutorial decision-making,
but this presumption may be rebutted by prima facie evidence to the
contrary.
70 Notwithstanding its broad scope, the Judiciary has correctly
highlighted that there are legal limits to prosecutorial discretion,
187 A vR [2012] EWCA Crim 434; [2012] 2 Cr App R 8.
188 Eg, R (on the application of E) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] 1 Cr App R 6
(that the policy set out in the UK Code for Crown Prosecutors was lawful);
R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service [2012] 3 WLR 1227
(that the test for the continuance of a private prosecution contained in the Crown
Prosecution Service's Code for Crown Prosecutors ("CPS Code") did not frustrate
the policy and objects in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (c 23) (UK) and
was lawful); R v Director of Public Prosecutions [1995] 1 Cr App R 136 (that the
Prosecutor failed to follow the CPS Code to have regard to the lines of defence,
which were plainly open to the accused); R v Director of Public Prosecutions exparte
Manning [2001] QB 330 at [45] (that the Prosecutor applied a test higher than the
evidential test in the CPS Code).
189 David Ormerod, "Prosecution Policies" [2012] Crim L Rev 653 at 654.
190 R v Chief Constable of Kent [1991] 93 Cr App R 416 at 428; R v Director of Public
Prosecutions [1995] 1 Cr App R 136 at 144 (which was acknowledged as "one of
those rare cases" in which prosecutorial decision was flawed as it was not in
accordance with the Crown Prosecution Service's Code for Crown Prosecutors).
191 See Roger K Daw, "The 'Public Interest' Criterion in the Decision to Prosecute"
[1989] J Crim L 484 at 500.
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namely, that the power cannot be exercised in bad faith or in breach of
constitutional rights (including the prohibition against double jeopardy
and equal protection of the law). It is the hallmark of a system governed
by Rule of Law that legal powers are subject to checks. An executive
power, even if it is imbued with constitutional standing such as the
prosecutorial powers exercised by the Attorney-General, cannot be
permitted to override constitutional rights. It is also clear that one
cannot sanction or condone an exercise of prosecutorial powers beyond
or contrary to the purpose for which the power was intended to be used,
that is, the maintenance of law and order.
71 The life and liberty of accused persons lie in this delicate
balance between constitutional law and criminal justice administered by
the Judiciary and Attorney-General's Chambers. It is argued that the
current scales of justice should be tilted so as to ease the burden of
the accused person in challenging prosecutorial discretion allegedly
exercised in bad faith or in breach of the Constitution. As it stands, the
accused shoulders an onerous burden to rebut the presumption that the
prosecutorial decision was constitutional. There is also no general duty
imposed on the Prosecution to disclose the reasons for prosecution in a
particular case. In order to prevent the above limited constitutional and
legal checks on prosecutorial powers from being illusory, as well as to
bolster public trust in the prosecutorial system and achieve a proper
balance of the potential risks of a wrong prosecutorial decision against
the risks of disclosure of reasons, the courts should consider making
some adjustments so as to broaden the circumstances in which the
accused person may be permitted to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality. Finally, in view of the onerous burden of the accused
person, as well as the importance of public trust, fairness and
consistency, the Prosecution should, as far as possible, disclose the
reasons for the particular prosecutorial decision, so long as the potential
risks of disclosure can be avoided and public interest is not
compromised, and seriously consider publishing objective guidelines on
prosecutorial decisions.
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